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Wilson: TRIPS Agreement Implications

TRIPS AGREEMENT
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASEAN
PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY
MARIE WILSON·

The new Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Agreement (the TRIPs Agreement), a result of the recent
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
Uruguay Round, represents a major step toward
providing the global trading system with more effective
rules and enforcement procedures for the protection of all
forms of intellectual property. The author presents a
comprehensive analysis of the TRIPs Agreement
requirements and of their ramifications for intellectual
property protection and enforcement in the Association of
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The paper concludes with
an assessment of the future ofcomputer technology
protection in the ABEAN countries.

• Marie Wilson obtained her J.D. degree from the University of Minnesota Law
School in 1979 and earned her LL.M. in International Legal Studies from Golden Gate
University Law School in 1996. She is an attorney in the corporate legal department of
American Protective Services, Inc. in Oakland, California.
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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most significant results of the recent General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round is the
new Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the TRIPs
Agreement) agreement which adds intellectual property rules
to the global trading system. the TRIPs Agreement requires all
members of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) to have
substantive minimum patent, copyright, trademark, trade
secret, layout design, and industrial design laws, as well as
meaningful enforcement procedures.
This paper addresses the ramifications of the TRIPs Agreement
on intellectual property protection and enforcement of
computer technology within the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Member nations Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and
Vietnam!
are diverse in socio-economic, religious,
ideological, and legal experiences, but together they form one of
the most successful regional organizations in the world, with a
population of about 450 million people.2 ASEAN nations with
the exception of Vietnam are WTO members and are directly
obligated to comply with the TRIPs Agreement.3
The ASEAN region is experiencing rapid modernization and
economic growth.4 The shift of the past few years from central
governmental control and agricultural economies toward
information-based and market-driven economies5 has fueled

1. Laos, Kampuchea, and Myanmar (formerly Burma) have achieved observer
status.
2. ASEAN was established in 1967 to achieve politic~ economic, function~ and
external relations security. Brunei joined in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995. See ASEAN
Documents Series 1967-1988 45 (3rd ed.), and ASEAN, Twenty-Eighth ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting, Brunei Darassalam 10-20 (July 28, 1995). See also JOHN
NAISBI'IT, MEGATRENDSAsIA 121-122 (1996).
3. Observers Kampuchea and Laos are also not WTO members.
4. Five of ten emerging Asian economies are ASEAN members -- Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. See NAISBI'IT, supra note 2.
5. Vietnam's shift to market-driven forces is the most dramatic, with Malaysia
proving to be an exceptional example of successful privatization and the Philippines
leading in privatizing infrastructure. See NAISBI'IT, supra note 2, at 110-116, 164-187.
See also Dhiraphol Suwanprateep, Thailand, IP AsIA 1994 HIGHLIGHTS 35 (1994).
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unprecedented economic cooperation among ASEAN members
and has resulted in a number of economic agreements,
including the late-1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on
Intellectual Property Cooperation (ASEAN Framework
Agreement). 6 This agreement commits all ASEAN members
including Vietnam to establish effective intellectual property
protection regimes and to comply with the TRIPs Agreement?
As South East Asia comes of age and becomes an increasingly
significant economic region of the world, computer
manufacturing, sales, and technology transfers are growing in
importance. ASEAN's computer import and export markets are
rapidly expanding and six of ten Asian "growth triangles" now
involve ASEAN members.s ASEAN and non-ASEAN
investment in computer technology is expanding and this is
likely to continue as interregional growth hubs play an
increasingly significant role in the ASEAN economy.9

6. See ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, (Dec.
15, 1995), 35 ILM 1072 (1996) (hereinafter ASEAN Framework Agreement).
7. [d. see also NAISBITT, supra note 2, at 108-145.
8. Growth triangles include the golden quadrangle (southwest China, Burma,
Thailand and Laos); South China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and northeastern
Thailand; the straits growth triangle (Singapore, Malaysia's Johor state and
Indonesia's Riau province); the northern growth triangle (northern Malaysia, southern
Thailand, and northern Sumatra in Indonesia); the Sulu Sea-based growth circle
(Borneo parts governed by Malaysia and Indonesia, northern Sulawesi, and the
southern Philippines); and the growth circle (Sulawesi province, Indonesia and the
Northern Territory, Australia). See NAISBITT, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting Asia Inc.).
See also id. at 126.
9. John Naisbitt in his 1996 book, Megatrends Asia, notes:
Where is a new millionaire to invest? In Asia, the answer is often
right next door. Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand,
where costs are still low, attract their neighbors' wealth. The result is
the creation of interregional growth hubs, each of which offers a
critical element in support of industry. One such hub ties Singapore
to Southern Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago in support of a
burgeoning electronics industry. Singapore brings the technological
know how, and the telecommunications and transportation
infrastructure, while Malaysia and Indonesia offer labor, water, and
electric power. It's a dynamic triad, win-win-win situation. A similar
effort links Malaysia and Indonesia to Thailand. NAESBITT, supra
note 2, at 166. It should also be noted that Motorola and National
Semiconductor are manufacturing in Singapore, and Hewlett-Packard
also has a production and a research and development center there.
Additionally, Hewlett-Packard has just moved its Palo Alto,
California hard disk drive base to Penang, Malaysia. Id.at 110-111,
120,122.
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Part II of this paper explains the importance of ASEAN
intellectual property protection of computer technology,
ASEAN efforts to date, the TRIPs Agreement, and the recent
ASEAN Framework Agreement. lO Part III addresses
substantive ASEAN intellectual property laws, related TRIPs
Agreement requirements, and the implications of the TRIPs
Agreement for ASEAN protection of computer technology. Part
IV analyzes ASEAN intellectual property enforcement laws
and intergovernmental· dispute resolution, related TRIPs
Agreement requirements, and the implications of the TRIPs
Agreement for ASEAN enforcement and dispute resolution.
Part V summarizes and also predicts the future of ASEAN
intellectual property protection and enforcement.
II. OVERVIEWS
A. IMPORTANCE OF ASEAN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY

Computer technology is a major item of trade in the world
today and this is true for ASEAN members as well. ASEAN
nations seek to develop and maintain "home-grown" computer
technology industries and attract much-needed investment.l l
They also wish to incorporate state of the art computer
technology into their production methods, telecommunications
infrastructures, and schools. 12
One obstacle to achieving ASEAN's computer technology dream
has been deficiencies in domestic intellectual property law. For
years ASEAN nations have placed a low value on individual
rights, including intellectual property rights. 13 ASEAN
intellectual property laws have also struggled to keep pace
with rapidly changing technology.14 The largely national and

10. See supra note 6.
11. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 35.
12. See NAlSBI'IT, supra note 2, at 165-166, 183.
13. A common attitude has been that intellectual property belongs to the public. See
Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global
Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 327, 329 (1993-1994).
14. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. (1994). See also Paul Edward Geller, New Dynamics in
International Copyright, 16 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 461, 464-67 (1993).
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territorial nature of intellectual property laws together with
these struggles have resulted in wide variations, even within
ASEAN, in the nature, scope, and adequacy of intellectual
property protection and enforcement. 15 For example, hard disk
manufacturers can expect a high level of intellectual property
protection from the well-developed Singaporean legal system; a
moderate level from the rapidly changing Thai legal system; a
low level from the Indonesian and Filipino legal systems;16 and
a very low level from the piecemeal 'and corrupt Vietnamese
legal systemP

As the value of intellectual property rights has skyrocketed
during the past ten years18 computer technology companies and
developed nations have become increasingly concerned about
rampant piracy and counterfeiting of valuable computer
technology.19 As a consequence, intellectual property protection
and enforcement has become an important trade issu~o and a
source of significant tension between ASEAN nations and their
principal trade partners - the United States, Europe, Japan,
and China. A growing number of ASEAN computer technology
companies have also become concerned.21
ASEAN nations are more and more realizing the significance of
intellectual property rights. There is growing recognition that

15. Jeffrey Blatt, Intellectual Property: Quantifying Global Inrwvation in COMPo
INTELL.PROP. L. & TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 2 (Chulalongkom University, Bangkok,
Thailand 1996).
16. Peter Popovich, The Clinton Administration's Efforts to Protect U.S. Intellectual
Property in the Pacific Rim, Remarks to the HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 10, 11
(Jan. 27, 1996).
17. Vietnam's People's Court system is notoriously unjust, particularly regarding its
treatment of foreigners. Adam Schwarz, Focus Vietnam: Trade & Investment -- The
Problems of Progress, FAR EAST. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1995, at 50.
18. Ironically, as the research and development costs of creating new computer
technology and products have skyrocketed, new computer reproductive technologies
have made copying less expensive. See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting U.S. Intellectual
Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 275 (1991).
19. Piracy connotes intentional and systematic misappropriation of intellectual
property. Counterfeiting refers to the practice of passing off and false labeling of goods.
20. Jeffrey Blatt, Comparative Intellectual Property Law and Techrwlogy Transfer,
Lecture at Chulalongkom University (June 18, 1996).
21. See NAISBITT, supra note 12, at 164-187. For example, major Thai exports are
now computer parts and electronic integrated circuits, and software use and
manufacturing are increasing. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 35.
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piracy and counterfeiting have a cost. They deprive ASEAN
nations of licensing income, lower production, reduce trading
and investment opportunities,22 and interfere with the
attraction of much-needed foreign investment, innovation, and
technology transfers. Strong, fair, and effective ASEAN
intellectual property laws will stimulate foreign investment,
technology transfers, and ASEAN success in the global trading
system,23 and offer long-term benefits of enhanced employment,
economic development,24 and innovation. 25
B. THE TRIPs AGREEMENT

Persistent efforts by developed nations and the business
community in the framework of the Uruguay Round led to the
conclusion of the WTO and the TRIPs Agreements, which add
intellectual property rules to the global trading system?6
Members must now meet significant standards of patent,
copyright, trademark, trade secret, layout design of integrated
circuits, and industrial design protection and provide national
systems that ensure effective enforcement of these rights. The
TRIPs Agreement builds on and works in conjunction with
existing international treaties, requiring all WTO members to
follow the Berne and Paris Conventions,27 and the Washington

22. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 13, at 327, 331.
23. High levels of intellectual property protection and certainty are important
prerequisites for many companies in determining whether and where to do business,
invest, or engage in technology transfers.
24. Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, The Impact of TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection
in Developing Countries, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1279 (1994).
25. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 13, at 327, 331. Creators need to be able to
recover their billions of dollars in research and development costs if they are to be
willing to continue to develop new computer technology benefiting ASEAN members.
26. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Punta del Este, GATT B.LS.D.
(33rd Supp.) at 19, 25 (1986). Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 5, 1994, 33 LL.M. 1143 (Uruguay of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT», Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to WTO Agreement, 33 LL.M. 1226
(1994) [hereinafter DSUJ; and The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Annex 1C to WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement].
27. Long before the TRIPs Agreement, the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (1883, as revised 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention), and Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1886, as revised 1971 and amended 1979) [hereinafter Berne
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Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits. 28 In addition, the TRIPs Agreement requires detailed
administrative, civil, and criminal remedies to protect
individual rightholders,29 and is the first multilateral
intellectual property agreement that is enforceable between
nations in dispute settlement proceedings.30 National and most
favored nation treatment are also required.
Developed countries were obligated to implement national
treatment and most favored nation treatment by January 1,
1996. The TRIPs Agreement recognizes that others need
technical assistance and expertise to comply fully.3t Developing
countries and countries in transition from centrally-planned to
market economies must implement the agreement by 200oa2
and by 2005, for previously uncovered patent protection.33
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei are
classified as developing countries. Singapore is likely to be
classified as developed and is already in substantial the TRIPs
Agreement compliance.34 Vietnam, though a non-WTO

Convention], began to establish minimum rights for intellectual property protection.
The TRIPs Agreement does not require WTO members to implement Berne's moral
rights provision.
28. Washington Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integra ted Circuits, 28
I.L.M. 1477 (1989) [hereinafter WashingtonlIPIC Treaty]; TRIPs Agreement arts. 1(3),
2(1), 9(1). See also supra note 26.
29. TRIPs Agreement arts. 41-61.
30. Though the Paris and Berne Conventions, supra note 27, establish minimum
levels of intellectual property protection, they lack enforcement mechanisms.
31. National treatment obligations require members to provide treatment to
nationals of other members no less favorable than that accorded to their own nationals.
Most favored nation obligations require members to accord to other members the
advantages, favors, privileges, and immunities relating to the protection of intellectual
property granted other nations. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 3 and 4. Customs unions
and free-trade area exclusions permit lowered tariffs on wide categories of intraASEAN merchandise and the ASEAN-Free Trade Area (AFTA) planned by 2008. See
GATT art. XXIV. See also ASEAN Free Trade Area, Flashfax Information Series, Doc.
2008, 1 (Sept. 1995).
32. TRIPs Agreement arts. 65 and 66.
33. Least developed countries are given still longer transition periods. See TRIPs
Agreement art. 65.
34. The United Nations classification tables are likely to be defIDing. See UNCTAD,
The Least Developed Countries: 1993-1994 Report X (1994). Singapore, one of Asia's
four tigers, prefers to reap the benefits of being classified as developing but the United
States and Europe now recognize it as developed because of its substantial gross
national product and recent economic growth. See Yamaguchi, Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 326 (1989).
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signatory, is obligated by the ASEAN Framework Agreement to
comply with the TRIPs Agreement.35 It is considered both a
developing country and a nation in transition.36
C. ASEAN FRAMEwoRK AGREEMENT
The ASEAN Framework Agreement is one of several
cooperative results of the 1995 Fifth ASEAN Summit?7 This
binding agreement creates a foundation on which ASEAN
members can begin to work together toward enhanced
intellectual property protection and enforcement, and
compliance with the TRIPs Agreement. The ASEAN
Framework Agreement emphasizes functional cooperation and
consultation,38 and offers the possibility of technical assistance
and
specialist
development,
automation,
increased
harmonization,39 reciprocal recognition of intellectual property
rights within ASEAN, and an ASEAN patent and trademark
system.40
III. SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY
Computer technology innovators, creators, and companies have
traditionally been restricted to the limits of conventional

35. ABEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2(4).
36. Vietnam's membership is unlikely in the near future as its legal system is far
from compliance with the TRIPs Agreement and other GATT obligations.
37. ABEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6.
3B. Id. preamble and arts. 1(1)(3)(6), 2(3), 3.
39. Id. arts. 3, 4.
40. Id. arts. 1(4)(5), 3(2). See also Sompong Sucharitkul, Introductory Note, ABEAN:
Bangkok Summit Declaration on the Progress of ABEAN Vietnam's Membership,
Greater Economic Cooperation and Closer Political Cooperation in International Fora
(Dec. 15, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 1063 (1996). Ultimately, an ASEAN patent and trademark
system will be created to provide an alternative to country by country registrations by
establishing centralized filings and registrations with rights governed by one set of
rules and granted for all ABEAN nations similar to the European Union's communitywide rights. See David Wilkinson, The Community Trade Mark Regulation and Its Role
in European Economic Integration, BO TMR 113 (March 1990 - April 1990). See also
Council Regulation 40/941EEC of December 20, 1993 on the Community Trademark,
O.J. (L 1111). It is likely that ABEAN intellectual property rights for the near future
will continue to exist or not exist depending on national laws.
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copyright, patent, trademark, and related trade secret laws.41
More recently some domestic laws and a few tre~ties have held
forth the possibility of sui generis protection. This section
addresses substantive ASEAN intellectual property laws,
related TRIPs Agreement requirements, and the implications
of the TRIPs Agreement on ASEAN domestic laws regarding
the protection of computer technology.
A. SOFTWARE

There is an· international debate over whether software
programs are most appropriately protected by copyright laws,
which generally protect original literary, dramatic, musical,
and artistic works, or by patent laws, which generally protect
ideas and not so much their expressions. For truly new and
innovative software ideas, patent protection may best limit how
fast the ideas can be replicated. For other software ideas, just
protection of the expression by copyright protection is the
apparent best path.
1. ASEAN Laws

Treatment of software has varied among ASEAN nations.
Most, like Malaysia42 and Thailand, have offered copyright
protection of creative software expressions43 but deny patent
protection.44 For example, Vietnam grants copyright protection

41. This is not entirely true as technology companies traditionally have also used
nonintellectual property mechanisms to make it difficult for others to pirate their work.
For example, computer designers embed logic into the custom ASIC (Application
Specific Integrated Circuit) so that by the time the ASIC is reverse engineered, it is
often obsolete or cost ineffective. Another example is the use of copy protection by
software publishers like Sony. Sony has taken steps to make its Play Station CD-Roms
difficult to copy. Finally, software writers seldom make their source available. The
executable code image is typically difficult to understand and use as a starting point for
further development.
42. See Blatt; supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). See also Malaysia Copyright Act §3
(1987).
43. For example, Thailand excludes from "copyrightable" works ideas, procedures,
processes, systems, methods, concepts, principles, discoveries, or scientific or
mathematical theories. See Thai Copyright Act, B.E. 2537 (1994) !hereinafter Thai
Copyright Act).
44. For example, Thai Patents Act, B.E. 2522 (1979 as amended by Patent Act (No.
2) 2535, (1992), art. 9 [hereinafter Thai Patents ActJ. Ministry Regulations do provide
for patentability of certain combinations involving software primarily tied to hardware.
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for software45 and grants patents only for software coupled with
hardware. 46 Those who offer software copyright protection
typically lack work-for-hire exceptions,47 recognize moral
rights,48 and may define reproductions49 and rentals for profit
as infringing.50 At least Myanmar offers no or unclear
protection.51
Like other developing nations, most ASEAN nations have a
number of copyright exclusions.52 Educational and research
uses,53 adaptations of software necessary for domestic uses,54
personal uses of pirated software, and good faith violations
may be defined as noninfringing.55 Foreign software not
domestically published within thirty days from first
publications may be copyright excluded56 or subject to
compulsory licenses if not translated for domestic use.57
Copyright protection for at least Berne members arises

45. Civil Code of Vietnam part 6, ch. I, art. 747(1)(n)(1995). See also Vietnam Decree
No. 20llHDBT regulating the rights of authors (Nov. 14, 1986).
46. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21,1996). See also Civil Code of Vietnam, part 6,
ch. II.
47. For example, Thai law recognizes that employees, absent written contracts to
the contrary, retain copyrights for their creations. See Thai Copyright Act, supra note
43, arts. 9,10 and 14. See also Mark Radcliffe, 12 Legal Issues in New Media
Technologies, THE COMPUTER LAWYER, at 5-6 (Dec. 1995).
48. For example, Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 18. See also Radcliffe,
supra note 47, at 14-15. Moral rights involve the right of attribution. Creators, even
after complete assignments, retain some ongoing legal control over their works
regarding adaptations, abridgements, damages to reputations, and prestige.
49. Single personal back-up copies do not infringe. See, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam,
part 6, ch. II, art. 761(1)(a)(1995).
50. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 30 and 31.
51. See John F. Pierce, Doing Business in Myanmar, AsIA LAw SUPP. 28 (Oct. 1996).
See also James Finch & Usausge Phone Myint, Myanmar Moves Forward, but IP Lags
Behind, AsIA LAw 20-21 (Aug. 1997).
52. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21 and 29, 1996). See also, e.g., Thai Copyright
Act, supra note 43, arts. 30, 31, 32 and 35.
53. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 7 and 32. See also Blatt, supra
note 20 (June 29, 1996)
54. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 35.
55. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 30. Good faith excludes acts by
those with actual or constructive knowledge they are infringing. See id. art. 31. See also
the Copyright Act 1987, Ch. 63 of the Statute of the Republic of Singapore §35-53
(1987).
56. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia have these restrictions.
57. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, arts. 54 and 55. Compulsory
licenses involve the use of intellectual property rights without authorization by
governments or third parties authorized by governments on payment of statutory fees.
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automatically,58 extends for fifty years plus creators' lives,59
and recognizes reciprocal rights for foreign member authors.60
2. The TRIPs Agreement

All GATT signatories must protect software (whether in source
or object code) and databases, to the extent they are
"intellectual creations," as copywritten literary works under
certain Berne Convention provisions for minimum terms of
creators' lives plus fifty years.61 Moral rights are allowed62 and .
the Berne provisions that permit educational and research
exceptions from copyright protection appear to continue in
force. 63 Software rentals are precluded except if legitimate
copies and economic rights of authors are protected,64 and
nations which presently offer software patent protection may
continue to do so in conjunction with software copyright
protection.

58. At least Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore are members and Vietnam has
drafted a copyright law which appears to anticipate its membership. See Berne
Convention, supra note 27. See also U.S. Department of Commerce, Intellectual
Property Rights in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Flash Fax Information Series,
Document No. PACRIM9947IVBIS3007, 5 (May 25, 1994) !hereinafter IP Rights in
Vietnam]. Registration is not required but can help preserve and protect rights after
the fact.
59. For example, Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 19.
60. Berne Convention, supra note 27.
61. The TRIPs Agreement requires software protection under the Berne Convention,
supra note 27, arts. 1-21 and the 1971 Appendix. See TRIPs Agreement, arts. 9, 10,
IOU) and 12. Berne rights include rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly
perform, and publicly display.
62. TRIPs Agreement art. 10. See also Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43, art. 18.
These provisions give creators ongoing control regarding adaptations, abridgements,
damages to reputation, and prestige.
63. Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Properly in the Global Marketplace: Impact of
TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L LAw. 373 (Summer 1995).
64. TRIPs Agreement art. 11. It is difficult to envision legitimate personal computer
software rental situations because software is easily misappropriated by home
installation followed by return of disks to rental agents. In contrast, corporations need
ongoing support and may be less likely to misappropriate. They may legitimately
benefit from rentals or licenses, especially when needs are short term or software is
rapidly changing.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

11

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 4 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 4

1997]

TRIPS AGREEMENT IMPLICATIONS

29

3. Implications
The TRIPs Agreement has significant ramifications for both
ASEAN Berne nonmembers65 and members. Nonmembers are
now obligated by the TRIPs Agreement and the ASEAN
Framework Agreement to come into compliance with Berne,
and members are now explicitly required to extend copyright
protection to software. This follows the consensus of Japan,
Europe, and the United States66 and helps ensure that hardfought battles regarding national treatment and minimum
standards need not be fought again. 67 The TRIPs Agreement
also effectively restricts ASEAN members from permitting
software rentals, and in some nations both patent and
copyright protection will be possible.
Certain problems remain unresolved. Though the TRIPs
Agreement copyright protection should impede wholesale
duplication of computer software and codes,68 it appears to do
little to prevent production of similar or functionally equivalent
variations by third parties, particularly unprotectable
functional components of software like databases.69 The TRIPs
Agreement also permits moral rights, with resulting
implications for ASEAN software licensing.7o Finally, the
TRIPs Agreement fails to address or effectively limit certain

65. Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18, 1996).
66. Michael Lehmann, Symposium: Toward a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm:
Comments: TRIPs, the BERNE Convention, and Legal Hybrids, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2622.
67. While copyright protection of software continues to be controversial, the TRIPs
Agreement's choice of copyright versus patent protection of software is probably the
better choice because it preserves competition versus temporary monopolies and avoids
the more significant international differences in patent laws. Bronckers, supra note 24,
at 1262-1263. See also Lehmann, supra note 66, at 2625-2626. Protection is especially
significant because advances in technology are making copyright infringement much
easier and less expensive. See Michael L. Doane, TRIPs and International Intellectual
Property Protection in an Age ofAdvancing Technology, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 465
(Winter 1994).
68. Geller, supra note 63, at 372.
69. ASEAN members, like the United States, may refuse copyright protection and
claim the "intellectual creations" standard has not been met. See Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991). Functional components have also
been ineligible for classical trade secret protection. See Geller, supra note 63, at 372373.
70. Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 1996).
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ASEAN copyright exclusions, which suggests that the negative
economic effects of these exclusions will continue.
B. HARDwARE
Hardware includes circuit boards, electronic components, disk
drives, and physical apparatus in data processing or computer
assemblies.
1. ASEAN Laws

Where hardware patent protection is available, ASEAN nations
generally confer patent rights on new, useful, and nonobvious
processes and products.71 Co-inventing is recognized72 and
patent rights are acquired on a first to file basis,73 with varying
but typically short patent terms74 calculated from filing dates.
Preconditions to patent grants include requirements that
patent applications be sufficiently self-contained to permit
others with appropriate skills to carry out the inventions75 and
most require absolute novelty,76 with patents being unavailable
to those who make public disclosures or utilizations prior to
first filings. 77
Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam belong to the Paris
Convention,78 which grants important rights of priority
regarding patent applications arising from signatory states.
Other ASEAN nations like Thailand grant rights of bilateral

71. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 5 and 36, and IP Rights in
Vietnam, supra note 58; Malaysian Patents Act §ll (1983).
72. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 15.
73. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 6(2) and 16.
74. See John G. Byrne, Changes on the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An
Overview of the Changes Required by GAT!', 34 DUQUESNE L. REV. 92 (1995)
(testimony of Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade
Representative).
75. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 19. The TRIPs Agreement article
29 permits members to require applicant disclosure of the best mode for carrying out
the invention.
76. E.g. Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 996).
77. There are a few exceptions to the absolute novelty requirement. For example,
Thailand excepts disclosures under trade secret agreements, for testing purposes, and
at official exhibits. See Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 6(2), 6 and 19. See also
Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996).
78. Paris Convention, supra note 27.
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reciprocity.79 Applicants filing in joint Paris Convention or
reciprocal nations within twelve months of original filings
receive the benefit of the original filings for purposes of
determining patent registrability.80 ASEAN nations granting
only reciprocityBl give competing computer technology different
values depending upon their countries of origin.82
Most ASEAN nations require publication of patent
applications83 and, like other developing countries, have a
number of exclusions from patentable subject matter and
patent exclusivity. Exclusions may include inventions contrary
to the vague socialist morality, utilizations for non-commercial
purposes, grey market circulations, educational uses, and good
faith infringements.84 Compulsory licensing provisions are also
common. 85
2. The TRIPs Agreement
All GATT signatories are required to follow the Paris
Convention86 and provide patent protection for hardware
products and processes87 which are new, capable of industrial
application, and involve inventive stepS.88 The TRIPs
Agreement further requires terms of no less than twenty years
from filingB9 and provisional application procedures whereby
applicants may establish the earliest possible dates of
inventions, defer examinations, file "continuations in part" to

79. Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, art. 19.
80. For example, Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, arts. 20 and 6(2). Neither the Paris
Convention nor reciprocal rights modifY domestic ABEAN laws. See note 77.
81. See, e.g., Thai Patent Act, supra note 44, arts. 14 and 19bis. Reciprocity protects
others' innovations to the extent there is reciprocal national treatment.
82. Geller, supra note 63, at 101.
83. Blatt, supra note 20.
84. See, e.g., IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 2-3; Thai Patent Act, supra
note 44, art. 36. Grey market uses may be excluded or, as with Vietnam, dermed as
noninfringing. Vietnam Civil Code, part II, art. 803.
85. Compulsory licenses involve government authorized uses by third parties. See,
e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam ch. II, art. 802.
86. Supra note 27.
87. TRIPs Agreement arts. 27(1) and 28(1).
88. TRIPs Agreement arts. 25(1) and 27.
89. TRIPs Agreement art. 33.
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incorporate new matters, and benefit from priority filing dates
of earlier provisional applications.90
Protection must be without regard to where products are
invented, produced, or implemented, provided that these acts
occur within WTO nations,91 and all patent applications must
be published within eighteen months of filings. Exceptions to
patent exclusivity are permitted but must not unreasonably
conflict with or prejudice rightholders, taking into account the
rights of third parties.92 There are fifteen comp~lsory licensing
prerequisites.93
3. Implications
The TRIPs Agreement represents a significant step toward
establishing ASEAN and international patent hardware
standards by addressing problems common to the patent
systems of many developing nations. The TRIPs Agreement
reduces local working requirements, limits patent exclusions,94
increases and standardizes typical ASEAN patent terms,95 and
resolves ASEAN's differing hardware treatment depending on
the country of origin by requiring signatories to follow the
Paris Convention.96 It also resolves the more and more frequent
problems of localizing the origins of creations97 and the
territories of infringements.98 While rightholders should find
reassuring the TRIPs Agreement's lessening of the pressure to
"work" patents, some of the TRIPs Agreement restrictions are

90. Paris Convention rights of priority are calculated from provisional application
filing dates.
91. TRIPs Agreement art. 27.
92. TRIPs Agreement art. 30.
93. TRIPs Agreement art. 31.
94. See Doane, supra note 67.
95. This should please multinational companies investing in or doing business with
ASEAN. Contrast Thailand's patent term of 20 years from filing which already
complies with the TRIPs Agreement. See, Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 35.
96. See supra notes 78 to 84 and 86 and accompanying text.
97. Technology is increasingly developed by simultaneous collaboration in many
countries. Countries limiting protection to mutual reciprocity have had to localize
innovations to one country, sometimes deny protection or create legal fictions. Geller,
supra note 63, at 101-102.
98. [d.
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still vague and easily subjectable to abuse,99 and domestic
exceptions to patentability are inadequately addressed.lOo
Many ASEAN nations already require publication;lol the TRIPs
Agreement reinforces this. Mandatory publication reduces the
problem of submarine patentsl02 but forces inventors to choose
between seeking trade secret protection or seeking patent
protection with the risk of patent rejection and mandatory
publication which negates trade secret status.103 The TRIPs
Agreement, like all ASEAN patent laws, protects those first to
file.
C. INTEGRATED CIRCUITS

The past twenty years have seen a rapid change in integrated
circuits, related mask works, semiconductor chips, and certain
new technologies lO4 which do not conveniently fit mto
traditional forms of intellectual property protection. As a
consequence, traditional protection has proven inadequate and
incorporation of new technologies into domestic laws and the
Paris-Berne regime has lagged behind.lo5

99. For example, the TRIPs Agreement prohibits patent interferences which
"unreasonably conflict." See TRIPs Agreement art. 30.
100. For example, the TRIPs Agreement leaves unresolved issues like whether
Thailand may permit good faith infringements. See note 55.
101. For example, Thailand. See Blatt, supra note 15, at 6.
102. Submarine patents are those which are continued without disclosure for a
period prior to grant, surfacing only when subsequent applicants independently invent
the same technology after frequently having spent valuable time and effort developing
products only to discover than the earlier applicants have become the valid patent
holders as prior inventors. See Blatt, supra note 20.
103. This decision is further complicated by the fact that civil law ASEAN members
do not typically offer trade secret protection though the TRIPs Agreement requires
them to do so by year 2000. See TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2) and see Giunta & Shang,
supra note 13, at 344. See also Blatt, supra note 15, at 6.
104. See Doane, supra note 67, at 469. See also Aerospace: Future of Defense, N.P.R.
radio broadcast (May 28, 1992).
105. Most semiconductor products are said to lack the sufficient inventiveness
required by patent law and are barred from copyright law because they are essentially
utilitarian. Doane, supra note 67, at 488.
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1. ASEAN Laws

Semiconductor chip protection by ASEAN nations is unclear,
but it is likely some have extended intellectual property rights
to semiconductor chips while others have failed to grant rights
or resolve gaps in protection. The Treaty on Intellectual
Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (Washington IIPIC
Treaty) offers semiconductor protection but fails to cover
articles incorporating integrated circuits and to prohibit
compulsory licensing. It extends protection for only eight years.
Developing countries have strongly opposed it.loo
2. The TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs Agreement remedies some serious gaps in domestic
and Paris-Berne protection by· following the Japanese and
United States sui generis solution to semiconductor chip
protection. 107 It requires signatories to protect unpatented
functional designs of integrated circuits/OS semi-conductors,l09
and articles incorporating integrated circuits for a minimum of
ten years, subject to a good faith exception,110 and to follow the
WashingtonlIPIC Treaty.11l Minimum protection is extended to
ten years.ll2 Rights of priority and compulsory licensing
restrictions are identical to those for hardwareya

106. See Third World Questions the Need for Integrated Circuit Treaty, 34 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 59-60 (May 21, 1987). See also WashingtonlIPIC
Treaty, supra note 28 and Michael Kirk, TRIPS: Intellectual Property Protection in the
Pacific Rim Countries, Address at CLE International Seminar 10 (March 17,1994).
107. The United States leads the way with the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984, 17 U.S.C. sections 901-914 (Supp. II 1984). This act includes a reciprocity
clause which requires other nations, to receive the benefits of the act, to grant the same
or similar protection. Japan and then the WashingtonlIPIC Treaty followed. See Doane,
supra note 67.
108. Also known as "mask works", "lay-out designs", and "semiconductor chip
topographies". See the TRIPs Agreement part I, section 6, arts. 35-38.
109. TRIPs Agreement art. 36.
110. TRIPs Agreement arts. 36-38.
111. TRIPs Agreement arts. 35-38. See also WashingtonlIPIC Treaty, supra note
28. Members must not permit commercial importing, selling or distributing of the
protected items. TRIPs Agreement art. 36.
112. TRIPs Agreement arts. 35-38.
113. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 38 and 37(2). See also supra notes 84-91 and
accompanying text.
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3. Implications
It seems no one likes the TRIPs Agreement integrated circuit
requirements. One problem is that the TRIPs Agreement is an
improvised or partial patch of the Paris-Berne regime1l4 and
the United States and Japan, by far the world's largest
producers
of semiconductor chips,
object
to
the
WashingtonlIPIC Treaty's failure to compensate for innocent
infringement.l15 Whether the TRIPs Agreement resolves some
of these concerns, it fails to address good faith infringement.
Still others question the need for integrated circuit
prptection. 1l6 Perhaps half a loaf is better than none. ASEAN
and American semiconductor industries should overall benefit
from the TRIPs Agreement explicit sui generis protection.

D. FuTuRE TECHNOLOGY AND HYBRIDS
In this age of rapid technological advances, hybrids are
becoming increasingly important. Though in most cases
computer technology is readily identifiable as hardware or
software, hybrid situations exist. For example, user interfaces
are hybrids of hardware and software, as are certain software
programs that are closely coupled with computer hardware
circuits and modern microprocessors using micro-code.l17
1. ASEAN Laws
Hybrids have posed difficulties for ASEAN nations and nonASEAN nations alike. Laws have typically been static and
rigid, and also vulnerable to becoming outmoded and useless.

114. See Geller, supra note 63, at 103.
115. Presumably concerns regarding remedies and dispute resolution are in part
resolved by the TRIPs Agreement's enforcement provisions and the new WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding COSU)'s conflicting and superseding provisions. See U.S.,
Japan Refuse to Sign Treaty to Protect Integrated Circuits, 3 WORLD INTELL. PRoP.
REP. 156 (1989). See also infra Part IV regarding the TRIPs Agreement enforcement
and the DSU and Kirk, supra note 106.
116. A computer engineer expressed to this author his view that chips that are
truly new and innovative are patentable and other chips are getting so complicated and
large in capacity, it is questionable how much protection is needed. Furthermore, by
the time chips are reverse engineered, the technology has moved on, in the present
climate.
117. Blatt, supra note 15, at 5.
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For example, the problem of software closely tied to hardware
has been resolved by some by extending patent protection.us
Others may provide no or uncertain protection. The issue has
been one of patent versus copyright protection and where the
line is between ideas and expressions of ideas. Past conventions
have neither addressed hybrids nor provided flexible
mechanisms for addressing changes in technology.
2. The TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs Agreement provides an ongoing fluid mechanism for
the adjustment and expansion of international intellectual
property law to meet new computer technologies. It creates the
TRIPs Council and authorizes it to undertake biannual reviews
of current protection and new developments which may
warrant modifications or amendments to the TRIPs
Agreement. 1l9 Regarding software coupled with hardware, the
TRIPs Agreement ensures at least copyright protection.120
3. Implications
Unlike previous conventions, the TRIPs Agreement makes a
general statement of authority to negotiate for changes in
current forms and new sui generis forms of protection. By
providing a flexible international mechanism, the TRIPs
Agreement helps ensure that ASEAN, regional, and global
intellectual 'property systems will evolve with computer
technology. Though the impact of these provisions for new
technology and emerging hybrids on ASEAN intellectual
property laws is unclear, the TRIPs Agreement ensures that at
least the hybrid of software tightly coupled with hardware will
receive copyright protection.121

118. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 9. Vietnam also allows for the
possibility of patent protection. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). See also Civil
Code of Vietnam part 6, ch. II.
119. TRIPs Agreement art. 71.
120. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
121. [d.
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TRAD~ SECRETS

Trade secret protection is related to intellectual property
protection. Trade secrets extend beyond ideas protectible by
patent law to secret concepts or ideas of value to the owners of
the secrets. Confidential information may represent crucial
business assets, though often it is nonregistrable.

1. ASEAN Laws

Not all ASEAN jurisdictions presently have legal mechanisms
by which confidential information related to computer
technology can be protected. In general, ASEAN common law
systems like those of Singapore and Malaysia protect trade
secrets and fiduciary obligations if information is of competitive
value, is confidential, and the owners have taken affirmative
steps to keep the secrets. 122 In contrast, ASEAN civil law
systems like Thailand and Vietnam typically afford no trade
secret protection or, when they do, protection is by statute with
gaps that case law does not fill well. l23 For example, Thailand's
new trade secret law will not be implemented for five to ten
years. During the interim Thailand lacks a good mechanism for
penalizing wrongful disclosure of confidential information,l24
though it will to some degree recognize trade secret protection
which arises as a matter ofcontract.l25
2. The TRIPs Agreement
All GATT signatories are required to protect "undisclosed
information" with commercial value, not in the public domain,
and subject to "reasonable steps under the circumstances" to

122. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). See also Singapore, Intellectual
Property Protection in Asia Issue 4, 8-58 (Arthur Wineburg, ed. 1995).
123. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18, 1996).
124. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 29, 1996). See also Christopher Moore,
Thailand .- Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreements under Thai Law, WORLD
REPORTS, Item 1289, 74 (Oct.-Dec. 1993).
125. See Christopher Moore, Thailand -- Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure
Agreements under Thai Law, WORLD REPORTS, Item 1289, 74 (Oct.-Dec. 1993).
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maintain confidentiality . from unconsented disclosure,
acquisition, or use contrary to "honest commercial practices."126
Breaches of contract, breaches of confidence, inducements to
breach, and acquisitions of undisclosed information through
third parties with constructive knowledge are prohibited.127
Self-help methods of reverse engineering are not expressly
banned. 128

3. Implications
The TRIPs Agreement is the first international convention to
expressly require protection of undisclosed information and it
should lead to increases in ASEAN trade secret protection of
computer technology. For some members trade secret
protection will be new. For others, like Thailand, which
presently enforce contractual confidentiality agreements but
lack codified systems of trade secret protection, the TRIPs
Agreement mandated formal system should provide the most
effective means of protecting trade secrets. l29 As most high
technology is not in the form of patents but proprietary
information,t30 the TRIPs Agreement's trade secret protection
should stimulate computer technology companies to license
advanced technologies more frequently to ASEAN nations131
and to choose trade secret protection as an alternative to
patent protection. Reverse engineering continues to be lawful
in at least all ASEAN common law countries and this may not
be a bad thing. 132 Perhaps the effectiveness of the TRIPs

126. TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2). See also TRIPs Agreement part I, section 7.
127. TRIPs Agreement art. 39, note 10.
128. TRIPs Agreement art. 39(2), note 10.
129. See Giunta & Shang, supra note 22, at 342.
130. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996).
131. See Geller, supra note 63, at 379. See also TRIPs Agreement part I, art. 7. One
high level computer engineer remarked to this author, "If IP trade secrets are not
honored, (ASEAN) countries will be at a competitive disadvantage. There is no way
(my corporation) would even consider working with a company that did not have to
honor our non-discIosure agreements and trade secrets."
132. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). Reverse engineering is part of the
high tech world and every company may do it. Provided trade secrecy agreements and
other ethical considerations are not violated, this may be acceptable.
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Agreement's trade secrets protection will be limited by the need
for plaintiffs in national courts to prove that those who
allegedly misappropriated trade secrets acted "contrary to
honest commercial practices".133

F. TRADEMARKS
Trademarks (marks) are valuable business assets that
advertise, distinguish, and identify the unique commercial
identities of computer technology products and corporate
names. l34 For example, Apple Computers uses an apple to
identify the source and value of its products.
1. ASEAN Laws

Words, names, phrases, symbols, and logos which are capable
of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from
those of other undertakings are capable of constituting
trademarks in ASEAN and most nations of the world. ABEAN
civil law marks are acquired by being the first to filel35 and
ASEAN common law marks are acquired by use.136 Malaysia,
Singapore, and Vietnam belong to the Paris Convention which
grants important rights of priority regarding trademark
applications arising from joint signatory states.137 Other
ASEAN nations like Thailand grant reciprocity. As with
patents and sui generis protection, those making additional
filings in joint Paris Conventionl38 or reciprocal nations within
six months of original filings receive the benefit of the original
filing dates for purposes of determining registrability of

133. See Preston Gates and Ellis, Mary Williamson, Kim Newby, Intellectual
Property Issues, AsIA LAw SuPP. 6 (Oct. 1996).
134. RICHARD BERNACCHI, ANDRE BRUNEL & GARY N. FRISCHLING, A GENERAL
PRIMER ON TRADEMARKS 1 (1993-1994).
135. ASEAN nations protect without regard to who first created the trademarks,
unlike the United States. See, e.g., Thai Trademarks Act, B.E. 2534 art. 4 (AD. 1991)
[hereinafter Thai Trademarks ActJ.
136. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 21, 1996). Registration is still advisable to help
preserve and enforce trademark rights.
137. They receive the benefit of original filing dates for purposes of determining
registrability of trademarks. See TRIPs Agreement art. 16. See also supra notes 78-82.
138. For example, Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, art. 20. Neither the Paris
Convention nor reciprocal rights modify domestic ASEAN laws.
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trademarks. l39 As neither the Paris Convention nor reciprocal
rights modify domestic laws, trademark terms and
renewability vary.l40 Infringement is defined by ASEAN
nations, and worldwide, as third party misuse of same or
confusingly similar marks. 14l
2. The TRIPs Agreement

Registrable subject matter includes that allowed by present
ASEAN laws. The TRIPs Agreement also requires express
protection of color combinations, combinations of signs, and
marks which lack inherent meanings but have acquired
distinctiveness through use. 142 Signatories may require
subsequent use, but may not require use as prerequisites to
registration. 143 Registrations may be refused and marks
invalidated if they are contrary to morality or public order,
deceptive, involve unfair competition, are not published before
registration or promptly thereafter/ 44 or for other grounds
which do not derogate from the Paris Convention.l45
Registrations must be effective for unlimited renewable terms
of at least seven years 146 and declarations of use must be filed if
uses are required to maintain registrations.l47
Protection must be exclusive and extend to marks used by
unauthorized third parties on dissimilar goods or services if
confusion is likely with owners' registered marks. l48
Markholders are still subject to limitations imposed by national
laws, though the legitimate interests of trademark owners and

139. See, e.g., Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, art. 28. See also Geller, supra
note 63, at 101, and supra notes 81 and 82.
140. For example, Vietnam allows for ten year terms with single ten year
extensions. See IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 5. See also Vietnam Decree No.
2411CP (regarding the extended time limit with respect to trademark registration)
(June 30, 1992).
141. See Thai Trademarks Act, supra note 135, arts. 20-27.
142. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(1).
143. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(3).
144. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(5). See also supra note 79.
145. TRIPs Agreement art. 15(2).
146. TRIPs Agreement art. 18.
147. TRIPs Agreement art. 19.
148. TRIPs Agreement art. 16(1).
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third parties must be considered.149 Permitted restrictions
include conditions on licensings and assignments, allowances
for fair uses, and invalidations for three years of uninterrupted
failures to use. 150 Compulsory licenses are no longer
permitted. 151
3. Implications
The TRIPs Agreement has few implications for ASEAN
trademark protection of computer technology, as trademark
law is already fairly well harmonized among ASEAN members
and elsewhere in the world. 152 While the TRIPs Agreement does
not require significant changes in ASEAN substantive mark
protection, it makes clear that unauthorized third party uses of
confusingly similar marks on unrelated goods and servicesl53
and of widely known marks are infringements. ASEAN
computer technology manufacturers and retailers may also
benefit from recent ASEAN efforts which exceed the TRIPs
Agreement's
present
requirements.
Soon
trademark
registrations will result in automatic recognition by other
ASEAN nations. l54 The ASEAN Framework Agreement
suggests at least the possibility of a future ASEAN trademark
system. l55
G. LIMITATIONS ON RIGHTS

Intellectual property rights are sometimes granted for
computer technology but then restricted by domestic
intellectual property and other laws, and technology transfer
restrictions. These limits may cause rights to be revoked or
149. TRIPs Agreement art. 17. Special requirements which cause unjustifiable
encumbrances are prohibited. See TRIPs Agreement art. 20.
150. TRIPs Agreement art. 19. Circumstances beyond markholders' control are an
exception to the compulsory use requirement. These include import restrictions on the
goods in question or other governmental requirements which impede use.
151. TRIPs Agreement art. 21.
152. For example, most of the world uses the likelihood of confusion test to
determine infringement. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 18 and 21, 1996).
153. This provision should reduce ASEAN misappropriation of trademarks and is a
change from some ASEAN laws. See, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam, part 6, art. 785.
154. Statement of Professor Sompong Sucharitkul, First ASEAN Secretariat
General, to author (June 18, 1996).
155. ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 1(4)(5) and 3(2).
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licensings and assignments of intellectual property

1. ASEAN Laws

Different devices are used to restrict ASEAN intellectual
property grants. Vague public health, morality, and welfare
limitations give ultimate power to governments to deny rights.
ASEAN members, like other developing nations, also provide
for compulsory licenses. For example, mandatory patent
licenses may be granted for failures of rightholders to engage in
local production,156 certain educational and research
purposes/57 and to improve earlier patents. l58 Certain domestic
prerequisites will apply.159
Vague and subjective ASEAN anti-competition laws interfere if
intellectual property rights may unduly limit competition, and
poorly developed ASEAN technology transfer restrictions will
create obstacles particularly if proposed transfers are not likely
to result in enhanced domestic economic output. 1SO Varying
restrictions on licensing further limit intellectual property
rights. 161 Licenses which involve unfair competition,162 lack

156. This is thought compatible with the Paris Convention which permits
compulsory licenses for "nonworking" of patents. See Paris Convention, supra note 27,
art. 5A(2). After the requisite period of time has passed, nonexclusive compulsory
licenses are granted. See also Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 46 and 46bis,
Singaporean Patents Act §55(2)(a); and Hadiputranto, Hadinoto & Partners, IndtJnesia
Revamps IP Laws, AsIA LAw 70 (June/July 1997).
157. See Geller, supra note 63, at 372. See also supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
158. This type of compulsory license is not expressly permitted by the Paris and
Berne Conventions. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 47 and Civil Code of
Vietnam ch. II, art. 802(1)(3).
159. For example, Thai law requires that patent compulsory licenses be necessary,
nonassignable, nonexclusive, aimed primarily at meeting domestic demand, and
include adequate or reasonable compensation. See Thai Patents Act, supra note 44,
arts. 48 and 52. See also Civil Code of Vietnam ch. II, art. 802(2)
160. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996). See also, e.g., Civil Code of Vietnam
ch. III, arts. 808(a) and 809(1).
161. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 38.
162. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, art. 38 and Thai Copyright Act.
supra note 43, arts. 15 and 16. The undefmed "unfair competition" is presumably
defmed by the Director General and is potentially problematic. See also Blatt, supra
note 20.
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unanimous co-inventor agreement/53 fail to be government
registered, or do not comply with other technology transfer
restrictions may be denied. l64 Theories similar to the European
exhaustion of rights doctrine may serve to further impede
licensing. l65 Finally, limits on ASEAN intellectual property
rights are reinforced by the ASEAN Framework Agreement's
recognition that restraints on trade and adverse transfers of
technology should be avoided. l66
2. The TRIPs Agreement
Signatories may act under domestic antitrust and
anticompetition legislation against excessive price charging,
unreasonable restraints on trade, and licensing conditions
which adversely affect international transfers of knowledge. 167
Certain patent exclusionsl68 and licensing conditions are
permissible. 169 Exhaustion of rights is not addressed but
presumably this and similar restrictions may continue.170
Hardware and integrated circuit compulsory licenses now must
comply with twelve requirements, including uses restricted
primarily to domestic markets, failed prior attempts to
negotiate with right holders, non-exclusivity, and payment of
adequate royalties. l7l Exploitation of dependent patents is now
163. See, e.g., Thai Patents Act, supra note 44, arts. 38 and 40.
164. See, e.g., Vietnam Decree No. 20llHDBT (promulgating the Ordinance on

License Contracts) (Dec. 28, 1988). See also IP Rights in Vietnam, supra note 58, at 6;
Blatt, supra note 20, (July 2, 1996).
165. European Union courts and directives have ruled that intellectual property
owners cannot prevent grey market sales (unauthorized sales of goods or services by
contractual licensees and distributees) because their rights have been "exhausted". See,
e.g., Centrafarm B. V. and Adriaan de Peijper v. Winthrop B. V., Case 16n4, E.C.R. 1183
(1974). See also First Council Directive 89/104lEEC of December 21, 1988 to
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 32 O.J. (L 40)
(1989), art. 7. See also Blatt, supra note 20 (July 4, 1996).
166. ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2(5).
167. TRIPs Agreement arts. 8 and 40.
168. For example, nations may restrict patents to protect public morality. See
TRIPs Agreement art. 27(2).
169. For example, governments may prohibit "no challenge" clauses. See TRIPs
Agreement art. 40.
170. See supra note 165. Japan, while not following the exhaustion of rights
doctrine, uses. an anticompetition theory to classifY unauthorized sales and
distributions of grey market goods as noninfringing.
171. TRIPs Agreement arts. 31, 37(2) and 38.
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limited172 and licenses for failure to "work" patents are now
prohibited. 173 Software compulsory licenses are permitted for
certain educational and research purposes1 74 but trademark
compulsory licenses are prohibited.175
3. Implications

The TRIPs Agreement fails to effectively restrict ASEAN
intellectual property abuses in several ways. It allows many
discretionary and vague ASEAN anti-competition, technology
transfer, and other restrictions to remain,176 and makes it
difficult to plan technology transfers with the needed
certainty.177 The TRIPs Agreement' broad and abusable
exclusions from patentable and sui generis subject matter, and
resulting inadequate "pipeline protection" of hardware and
integrated circuits, may continue to dampen development of
computer technology. Finally, compulsory licenses have been
historically abused by developing countries. It, appears ASEAN
software abuses may continue, though the TRIPs Agreement
should effectively reduce arbitrary and unfair compulsory
licenses of hardware and integrated circuits.178
IV. PROCEDURAL PROTECTION OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY
The increase in value of intellectual property has raised the
level of concern regarding the adequacy of enforcement and

172. Dependent patents involve improvements on dominant, or underlying patents.
The TRIPs Agreement art. 31(e).
173. TRIPs Agreement arts. 27 and 31.
174. See Geller, supra note 63.
175. TRIPs Agreement art. 21.
176. See Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1270. See also Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2,
1996).
177. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996).
178. For example, the TRIPs Agreement's requirement of adequate payment
reduces the likelihood of de facto expropriations of patents and sui generls rights.
Compulsory license abuses may be exaggerated as the consensus nature of ASEAN
people typically results in parties agreeing to licensing terms without governmental
assistance. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996).
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remedies for infringement. 179 Intellectual property rights may
be worthless without· adequate enforcement.

A.

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT

Foreign rightholders seek to enforce ASEAN intellectual
property rights and secure remedies for infringement through
domestic enforcement mechanisms.
1. ASEAN Laws
Rightholders in ASEAN countries have often felt that although
intellectual property laws exist, in actual practice they provide
little relief. lso Many ASEAN parties are members of the Berne
and Paris Conventions, but neither supervises enforcement;
five ASEAN countries - Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand - have recently been considered by
at least the United States government to be among Asia's most
serious intellectual property offenders. lsl There is hope that
ASEAN enforcement will improve soon. For example, though
Singapore was identified in 1989 as a frequent copyright
violator, it is now fairly consistent in its intellectual property
enforcement. 1S2 Thailand has also made notable recent efforts
to improve and has passed new copyright, patent, and
trademark laws. Recent Thai legislation also establishes a
specialized Intellectual Property and International Trade
Court and expands enforcement. l83 Another example of
improvement is Indonesia. While its laws lack enforcement,
particularly regarding software, it has agreed to make diligent

179. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996).
180. For a discussion of the developing nation gap between substantive intellectual
property laws and enforcement, see Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1273. See also supra
notes 58 and 78, and accompanying text.
181. Dru Brenner-Beck, Do As I Say, Not As I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84
(1992). Thailand was cited in 1989, 1991, and 1992 by the United States government
for severe intellectual property protection deficiencies. See Suwanprateep, supra note
5, at 35.
182. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 2, 1996).
183. See Suwanprateep, supra note 5, at 31-35 (1994). See also, e.g., Thai Copyright
Act, supra note 43, arts. 7 and 8.
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efforts to enhance enforcement and even now is drafting new
laws toward that end. l84
2. The TRIPs Agreement
With present domestic and international treaty limits in mind,
the TRIPs Agreement devotes unusual detail to enforcement of
private rights and attempts to create minimum standards in
terms of harmonization for foreigners seeking relief. All
signatories must ensure effective, expeditious, equitable, and
impartial enforcement of substantive TRIPs rights. l85 Civil
actions and damages, criminal penalties for commercial
trademark and copyright infringements/86 provisional and
injunctive relief, seizure and exclusion of infringing imports,
compulsory court processes, and discovery to force infringers to
identify suppliers must be afforded. 187 Decisions must be on the
merits and based only on evidence presented/88 be "preferably"
in writing, reasoned, and available to the parties; and include
rights of judicial review for certain administrative decisions.189
the TRIPs Agreement also requires recognition of third party
liability,t90 legal assistance, and preservation of evidence.l9l
3. Implications
Enforcement provisions are the most significant and farreaching provisions of the TRIPs Agreement. The TRIPs
Agreement offers at least the possibility of real ASEAN
enforcement mechanisms and should reduce domestic political
pressures that support deficiencies in intellectual property
enforcement. Two requirements of particular significance are
the right of appeal, presently lacking in many ASEAN

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See note 10, at 10.
TRIPs Agreement art. 41(2).
TRIPs Agreement art. 41.
TRIPs Agreement arts. 42-46 and 59-61.
TRIPs Agreement art. 41(3).
TRIPs Agreement arts. 44-46.
TRIPs Agreement art. 2, note 10.
TRIPs Agreement art. 41(1).
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intellectual property systems/ 92 and the critical mandate that
infringing goods be intercepted and seized.193
While the TRIPs Agreement makes it more difficult for ASEAN
nations to give just lip service to intellectual property
protection, the TRIPs Agreement enforcement provisions have
several limitations. The TRIPs Agreement does not require
special resources nor separate legal systems to protect
intellectual property,t94 and domestic laws prevail where the
TRIPs Agreement remedies are inconsistent.195 Though judicial
authorities must be authorized to grant certain remedies, the
TRIPs Agreement does not mandate their actual use and it is
unlikely new remedies will be used in jurisdictions to which
these remedies are foreign.196
The TRIPs Agreement also does not and can not do much to
address violations which lack complainants, nor ensure
independent governmental initiative in wrestling with
intellectual property violations. ASEAN intellectual property
holders appear to be still vulnerable to unreasonably slow
enforcement processes during which illegal activity may
continue. Finally, though national and most favored nation
treatment and the promise of technical assistance are part of
the TRIPs Agreement, these mechanisms will likely prove
incapable of addressing insidious discrimination against
foreigners by enforcement officials, inadequate training and
resources for enforcement, court decisions which are biased
against foreigners, and judiciaries which are not independent
of political influence and corrupt practices.

192. Blatt, supra note 20 (July 3, 1996).
193. TRIPs Agreement arts. 46 and 51.
194. TRIPs Agreement art. 41(5).
195. Declaratory judgments and "adequate compensation" must be available. See
TRIPs Agreement art. 44(2).
196. While damages, injunctive relief, and civil and criminal penalties are not
foreign to at least Thailand, jurisdictions awarding these remedies are likely to
significantly vary in the use and scope of these remedies. See, e.g., Thai Copyright Act,
supra note 43, arts. 62, 64 and 65.
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B. INTERGOVERNMENTAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
During the past ten years the value of intellectual property has
greatly increased, causing intergovernmental intellectual
property disputes to become a prime trade issue.197
Intergovernmental disputes arise when foreign intellectual
property laws and private enforcement fail. Governments then
look for mechanisms by which to resolve their disputes with
"offending" nations.
1. ASEAN Laws

Past efforts to force ASEAN members to protect effectively
intellectual property have been largely unsuccessful. One
problem is that ASEAN's largest trading partners have
addressed intellectual property disputes by resort to bilateral
trade-based approaches. The United States has aggressively
used its controversial Special 301 procedures and sanctions198
to push trading partners like Thailand to offer higher levels of
intellectual property protection and better protect United
States technology.l99 The European Commission has invoked a
new trade regulation2°O against ASEAN intellectual property
violators. Both have resorted to cross-retaliation.201
Another problem in forcing ASEAN members to effectively
protect intellectual property rights has been the lack of
meaningful intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms. Paris
197. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996).
198. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C.
§2242(a)(I)(B)(1988). The United States Trade Representative identifies a priority list
of the most egregious national intellectual property offenders. These are potentially
subject to sanctions and the withholding of generalized system of preferences (GSP)
privileges. There also is a watch list of other national intellectual property offenders.
See, GATT's Dunkel Criticizes U.S. Section 301, Urges Strong Commitment to Uruguay
Round, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 766 (May 30, 1990).
199. See 19 U.S.C. section 1337 (1988). See also Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1176-79, section 1302
(1989). The United States' initiation of proceedings against Thailand in 1991 in part
caused the new Thai patent and copyright laws. See Myles Getlan, TRIPs and the
Future of Section 301: A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUMBIA
J. oFTRANsNAT'LL.173, 196-199 (1995).
200. Reg. 264184, 1984 O.J. (L 25211). See also Getlan, supra note 199, at 218.
201. Cross-retaliation means retaliation in another sector (e.g., trade in goods) than
the one in which the original problem (e.g., intellectual property) occurs.
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and Berne have failed to provide real enforcement devices and,
until the TRIPs Agreement, intellectual property has not been
part of GATT. Though members can theoretically bring actions
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), this route to
intellectual property dispute settlement has never been
chosen. 202
2. The TRIPs Agreement

The TRIPs Agreement provides a two-fold government-togovernment enforcement mechanism to resolve intellectual
property protection between nations. The first mechanism is
the newly created TRIPs Counci1.203 It is charged with
monitoring domestic implementation,204 providing a forum for
consultations and assistance,205 and reviewing new
developments which may warrant modifications to or
amendments of the TRIPs Agreement.206
The second mechanism involves procedures to resolve
intergovernmental disputes through the new Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)207 administered by the newly
established WTO. The objective of the DSU is to resolve
disputes within one year through a process of bilateral
consultations, a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), panels,
investigations, panel reports, appeals, and compliance or
settlement. All WTO members must abide by the same rules,
be governed by the same procedures, and be subject to
authorized sanctions if they fail to effectively act against
counterfeiting and piracy.208 Retaliation may be authorized for
failure to comply or settle but is typically limited to the same

202. Paris Convention, supra note 27, art. 28; Berne Convention, supra note 27, art.
33.
203. TRIPs Agreement art. 68.
204. TRIPs Agreement art. 63(2).
205. TRIPs Agreement arts. 64, 68 and 71.
206. TRIPs Agreement arts. 68 and 71(1).
207. The Uruguay Round in 1994 revamped the GATT international dispute
resolution process. See DSU, supra note 26
208. The TRIPs Agreement requires intergovernmental disputes to be resolved by
this new WTO process. See the TRIPs Agreement art. 64.
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sector.209 Members injured by conflicting domestic proceedings
may seek redress or nullification.210
3. Implications
The TRIPs Agreement's two-fold dispute resolution mechanism
should represent a substantial change from past intellectual
property dispute practices. The new Council presents at least
the possibility of an inherent mechanism by which sui generis
protection can be provided as new technologies arise. Though
the WTO dispute resolution process is new, and it remains to
be seen whether its provisions will effectively enforce the
TRIPs Agreemellt, the DSU system appears to be a significant
improvement over the past GATT procedure. It provides
needed streamlining211 and formalization of the dispute
resolution process, and makes evasionary tactics less likely to
succeed.212 The DSU mechanism is also more likely to be
utilized by and against ASEAN nations than past systema213
and may be more effective than the present bilateral tradebased approach to intellectual property dispute resolution.214
It appears the DSU, together with the TRIPs Agreement, will

facilitate new international agreements. One result is the
ASEAN Framework Agreement which creates a more direct
role for ASEAN as a regional organization in resolving
intellectual property disputes at least among ASEAN
members. 215 The TRIPs Agreement together with the DSU
209. DSU, supra note 26, arts. 3(7) and 22.
210. TRIPs Agreement art. 23(2).
211. GATT cases under the old dispute settlement mechanism frequently suffered
from extreme politicization and long delays. See Leaffer, supra note 18, at 301-302. See
also Getlan, supra note 199, at 212.
212. In the past, defendant states could block implementation of panel decisions. It
is now more difficult to veto panel reports.
213. The new system has begun to function and a seven-member appellate World
Trade Court has more than a dozen disputes now pending. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum,

The Concept of Market Contestability and the New Agenda of the Multilateral Trading
System, 11 ASIL INSIGHT 1 (1996).
214. The idea is that sanctions authorized by an international body have more
clout. See Getlan, supra note 199, at 218.
215. The ASEAN Framework Agreement provides a dispute settlement mechanism
with several levels of consultation and cooperation. See ASEAN Framework
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5. This dispute resolution mechanism may be limited by
the little or no history of ASEAN intergovernmental intellectual property dispute
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mechanism has also facilitated a recent WTO agreement with
WIPO.216
While the DSU offers certain advantages it also may prove
disadvantageous to developed nations and legitimate computer
technology companies. One problem is that the new WTO
system precludes unilateral action once the TRIPs Agreement
is fully implemented and may preclude it during the transition
period. 217 ASEAN members contend, and they may represent
the WTO majority view, that the DSU entirely precludes
unilateral economic sanctions to coerce intellectual property
compliance218 and that transition periods are grace periods,219
Without bilateral pressure and the threat of unilateral
sanctions ASEAN nations may not continue to step up
intellectual property protection.220 Europe is impatient with
intellectual property violations and weak enforcement; and the
United States has already warned that it will press developing
nations to accelerate the TRIPs Agreement implementation

resolution, lack of ASEAN supra-national authority, and lack of a requirement that
ASEAN members submit all intellectual property proposals and laws for the TRIPs
Agreement scrutiny and Framework Agreement compliance verification. Though the
consultation method of dispute resolution helps ensure stable relationships among
ASEAN members, it may also restrict movement forward.
216. The WTO and WIPO, a specialized agency of the United Nations which has
administered multilateral agreements on intellectual property rights including the
Paris and Berne Conventions, see Convention Establishing the World Intellectual
Property Organization, 21 U.S.T. 1749; 828 U.N.I.T.S. 3 (1967), agreed in June 1996 to
create a special emergency dispute resolution mechanism using the international
arbitration center in Geneva. See Blatt, supra note 20 (July 4, 1996).
217. See supra notes 207-210 and accompanying text.
218. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 23(1) and 64(2). See also GATT art. XXIII(1)(b),(c)
and DSU, supra note 26, art. 26.
219. Implementation deadlines are 2000 and 2005 for developing nations. See supra
notes 31-36 and accompanying text. ASEAN developing nations are undoubtedly aware
they may demand compensation or request authorizations to retaliate if Europe and
the United States continue in their bilateral trade-based approaches. See TRIPs
Agreement arts. 22 and 23.
220. The majority of Bangkok Chulalongkorn University law school professors
believe Thai patent and copyright evolvement of the past five years would not have
occurred but for Section 301 coercion. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). Some
argue the WTO system will prove counterproductive by removing or impeding valuable
coercion. See Doane, supra note 67, at 482. Others argue that the United States and
Europe will achieve better results through utilizing the improved WTO dispute
resolution process than through their unilateral retaliatory actions of the past. See
Getlan, supra note 199, at 217.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol4/iss1/4

34

Wilson: TRIPS Agreement Implications

52

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 4:1

and will continue to rely on Special 301 procedures to
bilaterally confront nations until they have fully implemented
the TRIPs Agreement.221
The DSU may also prove disadvantageous to developed nations
in other ways. It provides a state-to-state mechanism only, so
private individuals with intellectual property grievances
against ASEAN nations will still need to look to other less
predictable enforcement mechanisms.222 The DSU also may
restrict the cross sector retaliation some believe is necessary to
achieve ASEAN intellectual property protection of computer
technology.223

v. THE FUTURE OF ASEAN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
PROTECTION
The TRIPs Agreement represents a breakthrough in ASEAN
and global intellectual property protection. By establishing
minimal standards - a prerequisite and the foundation for
future global and ASEAN harmonization - the TRIPs
Agreement creates a framework by which ASEAN nations can
work together to fulfill the requirements of the TRIPs
Agreement and the ASEAN Framework Agreement.
More intellectual property barriers remain in Southeast Asia
than in many other parts of the world.224 ASEAN members are
required by the TRIPs Agreement to make significant changes
in the way computer technology rights are protected and
enforced. Patent, copyright, sui generis, and trade secret laws
reqUIre substantial changes to comply with minimum

221. See note 10, at 5.
222. For example, private individuals may sue the offending nations, sue and seek
enjoinment in their home countries, or seek seizures and exclusions of the offending
goods at their domestic borders.
223. See Blatt, supra note 20 (June 19, 1996). Though the DSU requires samesector retaliation as a starting point, this may be a non-limitator. Successful litigants
may be entitled to apply cross-sectoral retaliatory sanctions to offset economic losses
caused by intellectual property. See TRIPs Agreement arts. 64 and 68. See also DSU,
supra note 26, arts. 3(7), 6-16,17-20,22(3), 22(3)(fXili) and 22(g)(ili).
224. Television interview of Mr. Kantor, United States Secretary of Commerce,
World Business Today, CNN International (June 26,1996).
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substantive standards now required for all ASEAN members.225
The TRIPs Agreement procedural requirements will represent
the largest changes.
The TRIPs Agreement and the ASEAN Framework Agreement
recognize that technical assistance is critical to effective
intellectual property laws,226 but technical assistance and
strong laws alone will not be enough. ASEAN governments will
need to devote significant resources and create adequate
infrastructure if strong laws are going to have a real effect.227
They will also need to educate their people about these
intellectual property laws and their benefits.
As pragmatism is necessary if ASEAN nations are to progress

toward a high-technology future and attract much-needed
foreign investment and trade,228 ASEAN intellectual property
protection and enforcement will likely move from ideology229 to
economic and political reality. The ASEAN Framework
Agreement, other bilateral agreements,230 and recent ASEAN
domestic law changes231 create at least a strong positive
appearance that ASEAN members are convinced of or resigned
to the reality that adequate intellectual property protection is a

225. Vietnam is indirectly obligated to comply with the TRIPs Agreement by its
ASEAN Framework Agreement obligations.
226. For example, Indonesia presently lacks intellectual property protection but
has requested assistance. United States governmental experts are assisting it in
drafting laws. See supra note 10, at 5 and 10. See also ASEAN Framework Agreement,
supra note 6.
227. See note 10, at 5, 10-11.
228. See ASEAN Framework Agreement, supra note 6, preamble.
229. ASEAN cultural and economic factors have traditionally placed a low
emphasis on intellectual property and other individual rights. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Cooperation in the Field
of Intellectual Property Between Thailand and Laos. A similar memorandum was
established with Vietnam in 1994, and is being or has been established regarding
China, Cambodia, and Burma. See TranBat Nguyen & Nghiem Xuan Bac Pham,
Vietnam, IP ASIA 1994 HIGHLIGHTS 38 (1994).
231. Thailand's new and the Philippines' pending copyright, trademark, and patent
laws together with at least Indonesia's and Thailand's commitment to comply with the
TRIPs Agreement on an expedited basis are positive indicators ASEAN members are in
fact serious about intellectual property protection of computer technology. See supra
note 10, at 10. See also Thai Patents Act, supra note 44; Thai Trademarks Act, supra
note 135, and Thai Copyright Act, supra note 43.
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prerequisite for effective trade and investment competition in
the global marketplace.232
Competition is fierce among countries to attract foreign
investment233 and as ASEAN nations promise to be an
increasingly large export market for United States and
European products, intellectual property protection will
become increasingly important. Though ASEAN's largest
foreign investor, China,234 is an unlikely or ironic source of
demands, other major trading partners235 are likely to insist on
more fair and equal trade terms than they have in the past,
particularly as computer technology industries play a greater
role in national competitiveness.236 Growing demands may also
come from ASEAN members like Singapore, Thailand, and
Malaysia, which have discovered that they have their own
homegrown computer technology to protect.
If there is reluctance to protect intellectual property among

certain ASEAN members,237 perhaps they can learn from the
experience of member Singapore which has significantly
increased its intellectual property protection in recent years.
Singapore has successfully leapfrogged over the industrial
stage and has attracted investment by multinational computer
and telecommunications giants Motorola, AT&T, Digital

232. Though some developing nations resent the TRIPs Agreement requirements
largely imposed on them by developed nations and enjoy the benefits of maximum
access to computer technology and the thriving parallel counterfeit and pirate markets,
the Framework Agreement recognizes that economic progress and prosperity for
members, entrepreneurs, and innovators will be fostered by enhanced intellectual
property and related field protection together with closer cooperation and consultation
among ASEAN parties for mutual gain in intellectual property and related fields. See
ASEAN Framework Agreement preamble, art. 2(5). See also Sucharitkul, supra note
40; Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1246-1247 and 1249.
233. See NAISBETr, supra note 2, at 108-109.
234. Ethnic Chinese are the largest foreign investors in Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam and represent 81% of Thailand's and Singapore's,
73% of Indonesia's, 62% of Malaysia's, and 50% of the Philippine's listed companies.
See NAISBETT, supra note 2, at 3-4.
235. For example, the United States, Japan and Europe.
236. See supra note 10, at 2, 3 (Jan. 27, 1996)
237. Some developing nations resent the TRIPs Agreement requirements largely
imposed on them by developed nations and enjoy the benefits of maximum access to
computer technology and the thriving parallel counterfeit and private markets. See
Bronckers, supra note 24, at 1246-1247, 1249.
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Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and Matsushita. Though
the selection of Singapore by these global companies has been
for several reasons,238 Singapore has the unusual distinction of
shifting from imports to indigenous technologies and attracting
recent, serious foreign technology investment.239
Some issues remain. Though the TRIPs Agreement provides a
mechanism for adjusting international intellectual property
protection to meet the evolving needs of computer technology,
the TRIPs Agreement, the ASEAN Framework Agreement, and
other international organizations may not necessarily be able
to develop standards to meet changes in future technology.
Another concern is whether the TRIPs Agreement and the DSU
will be able to effectively compel noncomplying ASEAN nations
to recognize and enforce intellectual property rights. Only time
will tell how these remaining issues will be answered and
whether major ASEAN trading partners can rely on
multilateral efforts, including the TRIPs Agreement and the
Framework Agreement, to effectively improve ASEAN
intellectual property regimes and achieve trade objectives
regarding computer technology.

238. For example, Singapore has the best transportation infrastructure, research
and development incentives, and tax structure of ASEAN members. See NAISBETT,
supra note 2, at 175.
239. See Bronckers, supra note 24, at 172-173.
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